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INTRODUCTION 
Justice John Paul Stevens recently bantered to Time Magazine 
that, if he could fix one thing about the American judicial system, it 
would be to make all of his dissents into majority opinions.1  Banter 
aside, he stressed that if he could choose only one of his dissents to 
turn into a majority opinion, it would be his dissent in District of 
Columbia v. Heller.2  Specifically, he said that he “would change the 
interpretation of the Second Amendment.  The Court got that quite 
wrong.  Gun policy should be handled by legislatures and by states, 
not by federal judges appointed for life.”3 
With that same hope, it is rumored that, during a lecture to the 
Harvard Club of Washington, D.C., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
expressed her strong desire that Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in 
Heller will become the majority opinion of “a future, wiser Court.”4 
Heller is still the subject of national debate and is one of the more 
controversial decisions from the Roberts Court.  The Court issued its 
pivotal 5-4 ruling on June 26, 2008,5 finding for the first time that the 
Second Amendment conferred an individual right to posses firearms 
unrelated to service in a well-regulated militia.6  In its analysis, the 
Court concluded that “central” to the Second Amendment is the 
natural right to self-defense, and by extension, the right to possess 
handguns for self-defense within the home.7  In finding so, the Court 
struck down a decades-old D.C. law that banned handgun possession 
and required that firearms in the home be stored safely.8 
Justice Stevens issued one of two dissenting opinions.9  In his 
dissent, he argued passionately that the majority rendered “a 
 
 1. Belinda Luscombe, 10 Questions for John Paul Stevens, TIME (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2097390,00.html.  
 2. 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 3. Luscombe, supra note 1. 
 4. Chris W. Cox, Justice Ginsburg Reminds Us What Is at Stake in November, 
NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N-INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2012/justice-ginsburg-reminds-us-what-is-
at-stake-in-november.aspx.  As could be expected, her comment raised the hackles of 
the NRA. 
 5. Heller, 554 U.S. at 570.  
 6. See id. at 634-35. 
 7. See id. at 628. 
 8. See id. at 634-35. 
 9. Id. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also issued a dissent. See id. 
at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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dramatic upheaval in the law” and decided the case on “a strained 
and unpersuasive reading” of the Second Amendment.10  He 
emphasized that the Second Amendment does not contain any 
“statement of purpose related to the right to use firearms for hunting 
or personal self-defense.”11  He also stressed that the Court’s ruling 
overturned long-standing precedent announced in United States v. 
Miller, which held that the “obvious purpose” of the Second 
Amendment was to “assure the continuation and render possible the 
effectiveness of” the state militia.12 
The decision in Heller raised the obvious question of its potential 
impact on existing gun control laws and whether they will stand up to 
a Second Amendment challenge.13  But few have questioned whether 
a “future, wiser Court” will simply reverse Heller.  Our Article 
provides a blueprint for how Justice Ginsberg’s hope may be realized. 
In Part I, we discuss the influence and guidance that dissenting 
opinions may provide to future, wiser Courts.  In Part II, we analyze 
Heller, paying particular attention to the tensions that the conflicting 
majority and dissenting opinions raise.  In Part III, we analyze 
landmark cases from future, wiser Courts that overturned stale or 
decidedly wrong precedent.  In Part IV, we draw from these examples 
in order to evaluate the conditions that lead to overturning a 
Supreme Court case.  Finally, in Part V, we apply the framework to 
Heller and suggest possible ways to author its reversal. 
I.  THE POWER OF DISSENTING OPINIONS 
Justice Ginsburg’s rumored comment differs slightly from her 
later-published lecture on the same topic, The Role of Dissenting 
Opinions,14 though it carries the same sentiment.  In her published 
 
 10. Id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 11. Id. at 642. 
 12. See id. at 637-38; United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). 
 13. Thus far, many gun control laws have withstood Second Amendment 
challenges in Heller’s wake. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ga. 
2011); People v. Montyce H., 959 N.E.2d 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Perry v. State Civ. 
Serv. Comm’n, 38 A.3d 942 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011); DAN VICE & KELLY WARD, 
BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, HOLLOW VICTORY? GUN LAWS SURVIVE 
THREE YEARS AFTER DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER, YET CRIMINALS AND THE 
GUN LOBBY CONTINUE THEIR LEGAL ASSAULT (2011); Post-Heller Litigation 
Summary, LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, http://www.lcav.org/content/post-
heller_summary.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 14. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, Presentation to the 
Harvard Club of Washington, D.C. (Dec. 17, 2009), in 95 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2010).  
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lecture, Justice Ginsburg wrote that she would rank Justice Stevens’ 
and Justice Breyer’s dissents as opinions “appealing to the 
intelligence of a future day.”15  She was referring to former Chief 
Justice Charles Hughes’s famous quote that “[a] dissent in a Court of 
last resort is an appeal . . . to the intelligence of a future day, when a 
later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting 
judge believes the court to have been betrayed.”16 
In her paper, Justice Ginsburg points to Justice Benjamin Curtis’s 
dissent from the 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford17 as an 
example of a decision appealing to the intelligence of a future day.18  
Dred Scott held that people of African descent whose ancestors were 
brought to the United States as slaves could never be citizens.19  
Justice Curtis wrote a pointed dissent, arguing that African 
Americans were “citizens of at least five States, and so in every sense 
part of the people of the United States,” and thus “among those for 
whom and whose posterity the Constitution was ordained and 
established.”20  Although the case was never reversed officially,21 
slavery was abolished several years after the Court issued Dred Scott 
and Curtis’s dissent has long since been acknowledged as the wise 
course the Court declined to take.22 
Justice Ginsburg’s declaration comes, in part, from experience:  she 
wrote a powerful dissent in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., Inc.23 that led directly—and swiftly—to Congress passing the 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.24  In Ledbetter, the Supreme 
Court held that a worker could not sue his employer for equal-pay 
discrimination that occurred more than 180 days prior, regardless of 
 
 15. Id. at 6. 
 16. Id. at 4 (quoting CHARLES HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 68 (1936)). 
 17. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 18. Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 4. 
 19. Id. at 4 (citing Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 393). 
 20. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 582 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 21. Dred Scott was superseded by the Thirteen and Fourteenth Amendments. See 
U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.  In addition, the Court noted in the Slaughterhouse 
Cases that the Fourteenth Amendment “declares that persons may be citizens of the 
United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and it 
overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United 
States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States.” 83 U.S. 36, 73 
(1873). 
 22. Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 4. 
 23. 550 U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 24. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
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whether the effects of the discrimination were ongoing.25  In a rare 
practice, Justice Ginsburg read her dissent from the bench, stating 
that “[i]n our view, the Court does not comprehend, or is indifferent 
to, the insidious way in which women can be victims of pay 
discrimination.”26  She continued, explaining that “[p]ay disparities 
often occur, as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in small increments; cause 
to suspect that discrimination is at work develops only over time.  
Comparative pay information, moreover, is often hidden from the 
employee’s view.”27  Congress quickly endorsed Justice Ginsburg’s 
perspective by passing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which 
was the first bill that President Obama signed into law.28 
A dissenting opinion generally aims to persuade a future court, 
Congress, and even future litigants, to adopt its view.29  Justice 
Brennan wrote that “the dissent demonstrates flaws the author 
perceives in the majority’s legal analysis.  It is offered as a 
corrective—in the hope that the Court will mend the error of its ways 
in a later case.”30  Justice Scalia, too, stressed that judicial dissents are 
meant to point to flaws in the majority opinion and to influence 
future litigants.31  When asked whether he views judicial dissent as a 
form of advocacy, he answered, “Yeah, in a way. I’m advocating for 
the future.  Who do you think I’m writing my dissents for?  I’m 
writing for the next generation and for law students.  You know, read 
this and see if you want to go down that road.”32 
With the guidance—and often the rallying cry—of dissenting 
opinions, the Supreme Court has reversed itself on occasions where, 
typically, conservative decisions became retrograde in the face of 
progressive societal change.33  Several of these reversals have been 
influenced by strongly worded dissents in the cases being overturned.  
 
 25. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 642-43. 
 26. See Robert Barnes, Over Ginsberg’s Dissent, the Court Limits Bias Suits, 
WASH. POST, May 30, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/29/AR2007052900740.html. 
 27. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 28. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html. 
 29. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 16. 
 30. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430 
(1986). 
 31. Dan Slater, Law Blog Chats With Scalia, Part II: ‘Master of the Dissent,’ 
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (May 30, 2008, 9:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/ 
2008/05/30/law-blog-chats-with-scalia-part-ii-master-of-the-dissent. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., Part III, infra. 
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Although we discuss a handful of cases, the two on which we focus 
most closely are Brown v. Board of Education,34 which overturned 
Plessy v. Ferguson35 and the “separate, but equal” precedent 
announced therein,36 and Lawrence v. Texas,37 which overturned 
Bowers v. Hardwick38 and other cases prohibiting same-sex sexual 
relations.  In both of these instances, the majority opinions were 
strongly influenced by the dissents in their antecedents, penned by 
Justice Harlan39 and Justice Stevens,40 respectively.  These vindicated 
dissents articulated a socially progressive position against the 
oppressive majority opinion.41  Thus, Justice Ginsburg’s hope that 
Justice Stevens’ dissent will appeal to the intelligence of a “future, 
wiser Court” is rooted in the Court’s history. 
II.  HELLER 
Heller is a landmark case because it is the first case to find that the 
Second Amendment “right to bear arms” conferred an individual 
right to posses firearms unrelated to service in a well-regulated 
militia.42 
At issue in Heller was a decades-old Washington, D.C. law that 
banned handgun possession and required that firearms in the home 
be stored unloaded and disassembled or bound by a locking device.43  
In a narrow 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the law, 
holding that it violated the Second Amendment.44  Both the majority 
and dissenting opinions primarily analyzed the highly-contentious, 
frequently-debated Second Amendment language reading:  “A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”45  
In those twenty-seven words, the Court found an individual right to 
keep and bear arms—unconnected to military service—in the home 
 
 34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 35. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 36. Id. 
 37. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 38. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 39. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 40. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 41. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Plessy, 163 
U.S. at 563 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 42. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635-36 (2008). 
 43. Id. at 575. 
 44. Id. at 635-36. 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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for the purpose of self-defense.46  Justice Stevens strongly disagreed in 
his dissent, arguing that the right to keep and bear arms applies only 
in connection with service to the nation in the militia.47 
A. Majority Opinion 
Justice Scalia penned the majority opinion for the Court.48  Broadly 
speaking, the Court concluded that the second clause, “the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms,” is not limited by the first clause, 
“a well regulated Militia,” but rather refers to a pre-existing right of 
individuals “to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”49  
With that “strained and unpersuasive reading,”50 the Court concluded 
that “[t]here seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and 
history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to 
keep and bear arms” unconnected to service in a militia.51  In doing 
so, the majority read this equivocal constitutional provision as 
creating a substantive right that had never before been found in the 
two hundred years since the Amendment’s enactment.52 
In addition, the Heller majority determined that the Second 
Amendment shields the right to possess handguns in one’s home for 
the purpose of self-defense.53  Justice Scalia wrote that “[t]he inherent 
right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment” and 
that handguns, in particular, are “overwhelmingly chosen by 
American society” for self-defense within the home.54  The Court also 
struck down the safe-storage law, noting that this provision “makes it 
impossible for citizens to use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose 
of self-defense.”55 
As open-ended as the majority opinion initially appears, however, 
the Court made clear that it did not intend for the holding in Heller to 
be boundless.56  The Court recognized that the right to possess a 
 
 46. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. 
 47. Id. at 651-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 48. The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, 
Kennedy, and Thomas. 
 49. Heller, 554 U.S. at 589-90 (majority opinion). 
 50. Id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 595 (majority opinion). 
 52. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Of Guns, Abortions and the Unraveling Rule of 
Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 265 (2009). 
 53. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 630. 
 56. See id. at 626-28. 
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handgun for self-defense is limited, noting that it is not “a right to 
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever 
and for whatever purpose.”57  Following this, the Court held that laws 
prohibiting the possession of guns by certain persons, including felons 
and the mentally ill, were “presumptively lawful.”58  The Court held 
that certain other “presumptively lawful” limitations included 
restrictions on guns in certain “sensitive places,” including schools 
and government buildings, and conditions on the commercial sale of 
firearms.59  The majority noted that these examples were not 
exhaustive.60  In addition, the Court found that the Second 
Amendment is consistent with laws banning “dangerous and unusual 
weapons” that were not in common use at the time, such as M-16 
rifles and other firearms that are most useful in military service.61 
In forming its opinion, the Court avoided dealing properly with 
long-standing Second Amendment precedent announced in United 
States v. Miller, the only prior case dealing directly with the 
interpretation of the Second Amendment.62  At issue in Miller was a 
criminal prosecution brought under the National Firearms Act of 
1934 in which the Court was required to interpret the Second 
Amendment.63  Miller was a unanimous decision holding that the 
“obvious purpose” of the Second Amendment was to “assure the 
continuation and render possible the effectiveness of” the state militia 
and must be “interpreted and applied with that end in view.”64 
Rather than correctly interpreting the Amendment as Miller 
demands, the Heller majority limited Miller to the proposition that 
the Second Amendment right “extends only to certain types of 
weapons,” and in particular, to “dangerous or unusual weapons.”65  
The Court simply swept Miller under the rug, concluding that “[i]t is 
particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 627 n.26. 
 59. Id. at 626-27. 
 60. Id. at 627 n.26. 
 61. Id. at 627. 
 62. In the years between Miller (1939) and Heller (2008), there were no other 
Supreme Court cases dealing directly with the interpretation of the Second 
Amendment. 
 63. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 177-78 (1939). 
 64. Id. at 178. 
 65. Heller, 554 U.S. at 623-27. 
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because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination 
of the Second Amendment.”66 
B. Justice Stevens’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Stevens issued a passionate dissent,67 calling the majority’s 
analysis “a strained and unpersuasive reading” of the Second 
Amendment that resulted in “a dramatic upheaval in the law.”68  In 
his astute dissent, Justice Stevens not only articulates how the 
majority failed to give proper deference to the Court’s own 
longstanding Miller decision, but also—and perhaps more 
importantly—he provided clues to future advocates looking to 
overturn Heller.69  In particular, Stevens demonstrates how the 
majority’s textual interpretation is sophistic and divorced from the 
intentions of the framers, and he detects the carelessness of the 
majority’s choice to arrogate for the judiciary gun-control policy 
decisions that instead should be made by the legislature.70 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens reads the Second Amendment as 
establishing the right “to keep and bear Arms” in connection with 
service to the nation in the militia.71  In direct contradiction with the 
majority view, he argues that the “militia” preamble is connected to 
the phrase “to keep and bear Arms,” meaning that the Second 
Amendment applies only to state militia service—not to an individual 
right.72  Justice Stevens concluded that the Founders would have 
expressly articulated an individual right to bear arms in the 
Amendment if they meant to confer such a right, as certain states 
expressly did in their own declarations of rights.73  He drew on 
historical evidence that demonstrated that the purpose of the Second 
Amendment was to prevent the federal government from disarming 
 
 66. Id. at 623. 
 67. Justice Stevens’s dissent was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer 
(who also issued his own dissent). 
 68. Heller, 554 U.S. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at 639-40. 
 70. See id. at 678-80.  
 71. Id. at 636-37; see also id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 636-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 73. See id. at 640-44 (comparing language in Pennsylvania’s 1776 Declaration of 
Rights and the 1777 Vermont Declaration of Rights to the Second Amendment, 
Stevens states that the “contrast between those two declarations and the Second 
Amendment reinforces the clear statement of purpose announced in the 
Amendment’s preamble,” i.e., that the right conferred by the Second Amendment 
refers exclusively to the context of state militias). 
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state militias.74  As to the right of self-defense, Justice Stevens argued 
that “there is no indication that the Framers of the [Second] 
Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-
defense in the Constitution.”75 
In addition, Justice Stevens noted that the majority provided no 
basis for revising the interpretation of the Second Amendment from 
the purpose outlined in Miller.76  Justice Stevens argued that Miller 
should not be undermined or limited, as it interpreted the Second 
Amendment correctly and as Courts, legislators, and litigants have 
relied on it for over seventy years.77  He argued that  
[t]he view of the Amendment we took in Miller—that it protects the 
right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it 
does not curtail the Legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary 
use and ownership of weapons—is both the most natural reading of 
the Amendment’s text and the interpretation most faithful to the 
history of its adoption.78 
In response to the majority view that Miller only prohibited 
“dangerous and unusual” weapons, he concluded that “[t]he Court 
would have us believe that over 200 years ago, the Framers made a 
choice to limit the tools available to elected officials wishing to 
regulate civilian uses of weapons . . . .  I could not possibly conclude 
that the Framers made such a choice.”79  Indeed, Justice Stevens 
concluded that “a review of the drafting history of the Amendment 
demonstrates that its Framers rejected proposals that would have 
broadened its coverage to include [civilian use of weapons].”80 
With his impassioned dissent, Justice Stevens aimed to strike the 
intelligence of a future, wiser Court.  He also sounded the alarm:  now 
gun control advocates and citizens must respond.  Stevens’s analysis 
lays the technical framework that would allow a future Court to 
overturn Heller, while outrage over the Court’s decision to take gun 
control policy decisions away from bodies that are elected, and better 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 637. 
 76. Id. at 637-39. 
 77. Id. at 638-39 (“Since our decision in Miller, hundreds of judges have relied on 
the view of the Amendment we endorsed there; we ourselves affirmed it in 1980.  No 
new evidence has surfaced since 1980 supporting the view that the Amendment was 
intended to curtail the power of Congress to regulate civilian use or misuse of 
weapons.” (citing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65-66 n.8 (1980))). 
 78. Id. at 637-38.  
 79. Id. at 680. 
 80. Id. at 639. 
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equipped to study and address the problem of gun violence, has the 
potential to galvanize a movement that would engineer cases offering 
a future Court the opportunity to right the wrong of Heller. 
III.   LANDMARK CASES FROM FUTURE, WISER COURTS 
High-profile, landmark cases from future, wiser Courts, 
particularly those affecting liberty or equality, have a huge impact on 
society, and not just because they decide divisive, charged social 
issues.  They also dictate the way in which myriad cases will be 
decided by lower courts.  The landmark cases that reversed prior, 
outdated cases are remarkable, in part, because the dissents in the 
first cases were strongly influential to the Courts’ opinions in the 
second cases.  Often, the dissents in the antecedent cases are 
recognized as forward-thinking and as having been correct all along.81  
In this way, it is useful to consider these cases as pairs.  It is unusual, 
for example, to consider Brown without a thought of Plessy or 
Lawrence without Bowers, and vice versa. 
Although each of the illustrative cases discussed below has its own 
unique set of facts, is from a different point in history, and was issued 
by differently-composed Courts, they all share a common thread:  the 
reversed decision represents a conservative, archaic interpretation of 
the Constitution, whereas the overruling decision reflects progressive 
thinking and generates social advancement. 
We discuss a handful of these paired cases.  We focus particularly 
on what is arguably the most famous pair, Plessy82 and Brown,83 in 
which Harlan’s dissent in Plessy strongly influenced the majority in 
Brown.  We also discuss one of the more recent pairs, Bowers84 and 
Lawrence,85 in which Stevens’s dissent in Bowers essentially became 
the majority in Lawrence. 
 
 81. Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 4-5. 
 82. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 83. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 84. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 85. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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A. From Racism to Equality: Plessy and Brown 
1. Plessy v. Ferguson 
Famous for its embarrassing “separate, but equal” precedent,86 
Plessy is a well-known disgrace to the Supreme Court for upholding 
laws requiring racial segregation in public facilities.  Plessy was 
decided in 1896, a time when racism was widely accepted and 
predominant.87  In addition, it was decided by the Fuller Court, 
notable for its many graceless decisions over the course of a twenty-
two year period.88  It is a contemptible tribute to our nation’s history 
of racism that Plessy was not out of sync with prevailing societal 
attitudes at the time, and that it stood as good law through the first 
half of the twentieth century.89  It was not until nearly sixty years later 
in Brown that the Supreme Court overturned Plessy, relying heavily 
on the wisdom in Justice Harlan’s dissent.90  The Court’s decision in 
Brown helped to fuel the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement and 
promote growing equality among the races.91 
 
 86. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (“The underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to 
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the 
colored race with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of anything 
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it.”). 
 87. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A 
Comment on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 
1437 (1997) (“I think the general consensus of our tradition has been that in cases 
like . . . Plessy the Supreme Court gave too much weight to the background social 
practices of the time and not enough weight to text, to founding commitments, and to 
things that have been constitutionalized.”) (citing Michael W. McConnell, The 
Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 115 (1994)). 
 88. See 8 OWEN FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED  STATES: 
TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 3 (1993) (“By all  
accounts, the Court over which Melville Weston Fuller presided . . . ranks among  the 
worst.”); see also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (forcing the 
separation of races in private educational institutions); Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York State law limiting bakers’ working hours, 
finding that it was not necessary to protect the health of workers); Cumming v. 
Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (extending “separate, but equal” 
to public schools); United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (stating that 
Congress’s commerce power did not extend to manufacturing monopolies and the 
Sherman Act could not be used to enjoin stock transfers placing ninety-eight percent 
of America’s sugar refining capacity in one company). 
 89. Plessy, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), stood as good law until 1954, when the Court 
decided Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 90. Rachel F. Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality, and Liberty: The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321, 1334 (2008). 
 91. See, e.g., Landmark: Brown v. Board of Education, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE 
FUND, http://www.naacpldf.org/case/brown-v-board-education (last visited Aug. 4, 
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At issue in Plessy was the Louisiana “Separate Car Act” that 
provided for separate railway carriages based on race.92  The central 
issue in the case involved whether this law violated the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s outlawing of slavery or the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal protection.93  In a 7-1 opinion, the Court ruled 
that, although the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to create 
“absolute equality of the two races before the law,” such equality was 
limited to political and civil rights.94  The Court reasoned that African 
Americans were socially “inferior,” and thus that equality did not 
extend to “social” rights.95  The Court held that “[i]f one race be 
inferior to the other socially, the constitution of the United States 
cannot put them upon the same plane.”96 
Justice Harlan issued a lone, forward-thinking, biting dissent, 
famously arguing that “in view of the constitution, in the eye of the 
law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of 
citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”97  Justice Harlan 
recognized the extreme social harm inherent in dividing citizens by 
class, continuing that “destinies of the two races, in this country, are 
indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require that the 
common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to 
be planted under the sanction of law.”98 
As a show of confidence in the correctness of his dissent, he added 
that “[i]n my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, 
prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal 
in the Dred Scott case.”99  As history has taught us, Justice Harlan was 
more than correct in his foresight: Plessy is widely regarded as one of 
 
2012); see also MARK V. TUSHNETT, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD 
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 116, 151–52 (1994). 
 92. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 538-39. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 544. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 552.  Plessy’s “separate, but equal” doctrine was later extended from 
public facilities to public schools by the same Court three years later in Cumming v. 
Richmond County Board of Education., 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
 97. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 560. 
 99. Id. at 559. 
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the worst—if not the absolute worst—decisions in Supreme Court 
history.100 
2. Brown v. Board of Education 
Nearly sixty years later, the spirit and substance of Justice Harlan’s 
dissent influenced the unanimous Brown v. Board of Education 
decision,101 which outlawed segregation in public schools and had the 
effect of unearthing the “seeds of race hate” that Plessy planted.102  In 
his opinion, Justice Earl Warren stated that to  
separate [children in schools] from others of similar age and 
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone . . . .  [W]e 
conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ has no place.  Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal.103 
Brown was strongly influenced by the strong, pointed anti-
segregation movement led by the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and its Legal Defense 
and Educational Fund.104  The NAACP developed a long-term 
strategy, executed by Thurgood Marshall, to desegregate schools that 
culminated in the five lawsuits that we know today as Brown.105  This 
was a powerful, multi-year attack on an outdated, harmful 
precedent.106  Thurgood Marshall argued for the desegregation of 
 
 100. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Plessy “was wrong the day it was 
decided.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (joint 
opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).  
 101. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 102. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  In addition, Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Plessy was influential to later courts post-Brown and was broadened to 
issues of sexual orientation.  In Romer v. Evans, for example, Justice Kennedy 
invoked Harlan’s dissent, holding that “Justice Harlan admonished this Court that 
the Constitution ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’  Unheeded 
then, those words now are understood to state a commitment to the law’s neutrality 
where the rights of a person are at stake.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) 
(quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 103. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95. 
 104. “With an Even Hand”: Brown v. Board at 50, THE LIBRARY OF CONG. 
EXHIBITIONS, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html (last visited Aug. 
31, 2012). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Excerpt from “The Winding Road to Brown: An LDF Chronology,” 
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.naacpldf.org/files/Excerpt%20From%20 
The%20Winding%20Road%20to%20Brown.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2012) 
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schools before the Supreme Court, later becoming the first African 
American appointed to the Supreme Court.107 
The anti-segregation movement that led to Brown also served as a 
catalyst for the civil rights movement.108  Importantly, Brown was 
decided in 1954—the dawn of what became the vibrant Civil Rights 
Movement.109  For context, Brown was decided a few years before the 
famous Greensboro sit-ins110 and merely one year before Rosa Parks 
made history by refusing to give up her seat on a bus in Montgomery, 
Alabama.111  The anti-segregation movement, coupled with the 
broader Civil Rights Movement, challenged the conventions and 
rhetoric that stained the Court’s prior analysis, paving the way for the 
Court to overturn oppressive decisions. 
The changing social tide is reflected in Justice Warren’s majority 
opinion, which tells the story of the past decision that simply no 
longer fits the knowledge and awareness of the present day.  He 
wrote that “[w]hatever may have been the extent of psychological 
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [that 
segregation has negative psychological effects] is amply supported by 
modern authority.  Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to 
this finding is rejected.”112 
Without question, the composition of the Court had a large impact 
on the outcome of the decision.  The Warren Court was known as a 
progressive court responsible for advancing civil rights and civil 
 
[hereinafter NAACP, Winding Road]; see also NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, 
supra note 91. 
 107. NAACP, Winding Road, supra note 106. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id.; see also infra notes 112, 113.  
 110.  Larry Copeland, Sit-Ins Reignited The Civil Rights Movement 50 Years Ago, 
USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-02-01-sit-ins-
civil-rights_N.htm. 
 111. Opinion, A Medal for Rosa Parks, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1999, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/18/opinion/a-medal-for-rosa-parks.html. 
 112. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.  Brown’s application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment led to other cases that outlawed state-enforced racial separation.  For 
example, in Loving v. Virginia, 386 U.S. 1 (1967), possibly the most aptly-named case 
in Supreme Court history, the Court overturned Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 
(1883), and other cases upholding anti-miscegenation laws.  The Loving and Pace 
pair reflects instances in which the Court simply realizes, without a guiding prior 
dissent, that an earlier decision was grievously wrong.  While there was no strong 
dissent in Pace to serve as guide, the general themes of Harlan’s great Plessy dissent 
pervade the reasoning of Loving.  Unfortunately, there were eighty years between 
decisions—eighty years in which laws criminalized interracial marriage—but when it 
was finally decided, it was another hit for the Warren Court. 
ABORN & KOURY_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:44 PM 
1368 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
liberties113—the mirror opposite of the Fuller Court.114  The Warren 
Court issued a number of socially progressive decisions, including 
Gideon v. Wainwright,115 which required that indigent criminal 
defendants receive publicly-funded counsel; Miranda v. Arizona,116 
which required that a person interrogated while in police custody 
have certain rights clearly explained to him; and Griswold v. 
Connecticut,117 which affirmed a constitutionally protected right of 
privacy. 
B. From Repression to Sexual Freedom: Bowers and Lawrence 
1. Bowers v. Hardwick 
Although it remains to be seen whether his dissent in Heller will 
become the law of the land, Justice Stevens undoubtedly enjoyed 
watching the substance of his dissent in Bowers118 become the 
majority opinion in Lawrence.119 
At issue in Bowers was a Georgia law that criminalized same-sex 
sexual activity.120  The Bowers Court upheld the law, finding that the 
Framers did not intend for there to be a “fundamental right [for] 
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy.”121  Like Heller, 
Bowers was decided by a conservative 5-4 majority.122 
Justice Stevens wrote a scathing dissent, arguing that the Court 
should have relied on the substantive due process liberty cases123 
rather than the intimate-association cases.124  Thus, Justice Stevens 
argued that the substantive due process liberty protection should be 
applied equally, “regardless of whether the parties who engage in it 
are married or unmarried, or are of the same or different sexes.”125 
 
 113. EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT: THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND 
FOREIGN LAW 14 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2007). 
 114. See, e.g., FISS, supra note 88. 
 115. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 116. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 117. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 118. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 214 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 119. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 120. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88 (majority opinion). 
 121. Id. at 192. 
 122. Id. at 187. 
 123. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965)). 
 124. Id. at 216 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)). 
 125. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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In his dissent, Justice Stevens encouraged a future, wiser Court to 
consider a common sense, rational view: 
Although the meaning of the principle that ‘all men are created 
equal’ is not always clear, it surely must mean that every free citizen 
has the same interest in ‘liberty’ that the members of the majority 
share.  From the standpoint of the individual, the homosexual and 
the heterosexual have the same interest in deciding how he will live 
his own life, and, more narrowly, how he will conduct himself in his 
personal and voluntary associations with his companions.  State 
intrusion into the private conduct of either is equally burdensome.126 
Bowers was a major setback for the gay rights movement.127  
Although there was fairly substantial support for gay rights at the 
time, Bowers was decided at the height of the AIDS crisis, in which 
fear over homosexual activity was peaking.128  In addition, resistance 
to the gay rights movement was strong as increased visibility of 
homosexuality led to a backlash from conservative elements in 
society.129 
Furthermore, it was the moderate and often contradictory Burger 
court that decided Bowers.130  Justice Burger himself made no attempt 
to hide his personal feelings about sodomy.  In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Burger drew upon “millennia of moral teaching” and 
argued that sodomy was a “crime not fit to be named.”131  Yet, 
although it leaned to the right, the Burger Court upheld and even 
expanded some of the decisions that came out of the Warren Court,132 
including those providing for racial equality.133  This trend may 
indicate that once the Court grants individual rights, it may be 
difficult for future Courts to restrict those rights, as the public 
 
 126. Id. at 218-19. 
 127. ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 98-99 (2005); CRAIG A. 
RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS:  THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 61 (2002). 
 128. ANDERSEN, supra note 127, at 74. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Editorial, Justice Burger’s Contradictions, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1995, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/27/opinion/justice-burger-s-contradictions.html. 
 131. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring). 
 132. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 130.  Despite being fairly moderate, the Burger 
Court can claim one of the most famous liberal Supreme Court decisions, Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 133. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
(promoting integration in schools). 
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becomes reliant on them.  This is a challenge those seeking to 
overturn Heller may face. 
2. Lawrence v. Texas 
The Court expressly adopted Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion 
in Bowers seventeen years later in Lawrence v. Texas.134  Lawrence 
concerned a Texas law that criminalized same-sex sodomy.135  The 6-3 
liberal majority led by Justice Kennedy held that the Bowers Court 
viewed liberty too narrowly and that, just as Justice Stevens had 
argued, intimate consensual sexual conduct was part of the liberty 
protected by substantive due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.136  This decision had the effect of invalidating similar 
laws across the country.137 
The Lawrence majority relied heavily on Justice Stevens’s dissent 
in Bowers, even noting that his analysis “should have been controlling 
in Bowers and should control here.  Bowers was not correct when it 
was decided, and it is not correct today.  It ought not to remain 
binding precedent.  Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is 
overruled.”138 
Lawrence was decided in the later days of the Rehnquist Court.139 
Rehnquist himself was quite conservative, and under his leadership 
the Court bent conservatively on many issues.140  At the time 
Lawrence was decided, however, the Court was fairly moderate, with 
Justice O’Connor, known as the great moderate and consensus 
builder,141 splitting the divide between the liberal and conservative 
 
 134. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 135. Id. at 562. 
 136. Id. at 578. 
 137. It should be noted that, despite the holding in Lawrence, Texas, among other 
states, still lists “homosexual conduct” as a criminal offense in its penal code.  See 
Tim Murphy, The Unconstitutional Anti-Gay Law That Just Won’t Die, MOTHER 
JONES, (Apr. 13, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/ 
2011/04/lawrence-texas-homosexual-conduct-statute. 
 138. 539 U.S. at 578. 
 139. The Rehnquist Court ran from 1986-2005, ending just two years after 
Lawrence was decided. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2012).  
 140. Joan Biskupic, Rehnquist Left Supreme Court with Conservative Legacy, 
USA TODAY, Sept. 4, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/ 
supremecourtjustices/2005-09-04-rehnquist-legacy_x.htm. 
 141. Editorial, Voice of Moderation: O’Connor’s Departure Removes Consensus 
Builder, HOUSTON CHRON., July 2, 2005, http://www.chron.com/opinion/ 
editorials/article/Voice-of-moderation-O-Connor-s-departure-removes-1914784.php. 
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blocks of the Court and leading the way forward in many areas of the 
law.142 
Importantly, in the intervening seventeen years between Bowers 
and Lawrence, the gay rights movement became stronger in number 
and force and was increasingly successful in developing social 
acceptance of core issues affecting gay rights.  Acknowledging that 
changing societal attitudes can change the course of constitutional 
jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy stated in his majority opinion that 
“[t]imes can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see 
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to 
oppress.  As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation 
can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”143 
Brown, Lawrence, and Heller each had strong, distinct social 
movements behind them that put pressure on and helped to influence 
the decisions in their respective Courts.  There are, however, those 
cases in which a hot social issue is at stake, such as privacy or freedom 
of religion, but in which there is not a corresponding social 
movement. 
C. Other Illustrative Cases from Future Courts 
In addition to the cases discussed thus far, there are also those 
cases in which strong dissents have appealed to a future Court but 
that do not have a corresponding social movement.  For example, in 
Katz v. United States,144 the Warren Court overruled Olmstead v. 
United States,145 a 5-4 decision that held that there was no 
constitutional right to privacy and that warrantless wiretapped private 
telephone conversations did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.146 
Justice Brandeis issued a now-famous dissent, arguing that the 
“right to be let alone” was the most important right available to 
mankind.147  Justice Brandeis reached out to future, wiser Courts by 
warning about the advancement of technology and its possible 
intrusion into constitutionally protected areas.  He wrote: 
 
 142. See Biskupic, supra note 140; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469 (2005); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)(previously Ashcroft v. Raich); 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  
 143. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. 
 144. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 145. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 146. Id. at 486. 
 147. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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[t]he progress of science in furnishing the government with means of 
espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping.  Ways may some 
day be developed by which the government, without removing 
papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by 
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate 
occurrences of the home.148 
Nearly forty years later, Brandeis’s dissent was adopted by a 7-1 
majority in Katz.149  The Katz Court concluded that electronic 
surveillance is unconstitutional because it violates an individual’s 
right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures.150 
As the cases we have discussed thus far demonstrate, the Court 
often moves slowly in reversing its own wrongly decided decisions.  
For Plessy, it took nearly sixty years, Loving took over eighty, 
Olmstead, nearly forty, and Bowers, seventeen years.151  There are, 
however, a handful of cases in which the turnaround time was 
relatively quick.  For example, in a short three-year turnaround, West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette152 overruled 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis.153  The Court in Minersville 
held, in an 8-1 decision, that religious freedoms must yield to state 
authority as long as the state was not directly restricting or promoting 
religion.154 
Justice Stone dissented, arguing that religious freedom was outside 
the jurisdiction of the government.155  He argued that “it is a long step, 
and one which I am unable to take, to the position that government 
may, as a supposed educational measure and as a means of 
disciplining the young, compel public affirmations which violate their 
religious conscience.”156 
The Court reversed itself three years later in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, holding that “[i]f there is any fixed 
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
 
 148. Id. at 474. 
 149. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See supra Part III.  
 152. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 153. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 154. Id. at 599-600. 
 155. Id. at 605-07 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 602. 
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word or act their faith therein.”157  Gobitis was reversed, in part, 
because Justice Stone had become the Chief Justice one year after 
penning his dissent; also, two new members had joined the Court, 
changing the composition such that Gobitis was overruled 6-3.158 
Although these cases did not have a social movement behind them, 
they nonetheless dealt directly with the contentious issues of privacy 
and freedom of religion.  Thus, the strong dissenting opinions in the 
antecedent cases were more likely to influence the future Court by 
hitting on issues of heightened social importance.159 
IV.  FACTORS LEADING TO A DECISION BEING OVERTURNED 
Drawing primarily on the above real-world examples, there are a 
variety of factors that indicate whether a Supreme Court case is 
subject to reversal.  These include:  (a) whether the decision becomes 
retrograde against the tenor of society or a strong social movement; 
(b) the strength and guidance of a prior dissent, particularly those 
dissents that expose the moral or intellectual flaws in the majority 
opinion; (c) the degree of consensus among the Justices; and (d) the 
composition of the Court when the challenge is presented.  These 
factors are discussed in detail below. 
A. Retrograde Decision in Face of Strong Social Movement 
One of the strongest indicators that a case is ripe to be overturned 
is when it becomes grossly out of touch with social or political 
advancements, particularly when there is a strong social movement 
brewing when the prior case is up for review.160  This is obvious with 
Plessy and Pace, in particular, but was also a factor in the demise of 
Bowers. 
The emerging civil rights movement had an enormous impact on 
the overturning of Plessy.161  As discussed above, by the time Brown 
was presented to the Court, the famous lunch-counter sit-ins had 
begun and a substantial anti-segregation movement was swelling in 
America.162  Brown reminds us that it is not just the size of a social 
 
 157. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 158. See Robert S. Peck, New Supreme Court Justices and the ‘Freshman Effect,’ 4 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 149, 168 n.113 (2009) (noting the addition of newcomers 
Justices Jackson and Rutledge as part of the 6-3 majority in Barnette). 
 159. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 7. 
 160. See supra Parts III.A.2, III.B.2. 
 161. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 91. 
 162. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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movement, in terms of the number of participants, and those who 
passively support its aims, but the focus, strategic savvy, and tenacity 
that the participants bring to a movement that can determine its 
ultimate ability to achieve change.163  The NAACP engineered a 
brilliant legal strategy, built over the course of years, which 
culminated in persuading the Supreme Court to reject the bigotries 
that resulted in Plessy.164  Brown was both a practical and symbolic 
victory for the civil rights movement, and the change it helped bring 
about prepared the ground for the further victory of Loving. 
In a similar fashion, the gay rights social movement organized to 
overturn Bowers.  As with the civil rights movement and Brown, the 
gay rights movement engineered a sophisticated strategy that helped 
achieve the result of Lawrence.165  Lawrence, like Brown, was a 
practical as well as symbolic victory, and it energized a movement 
that subsequently picked up additional victories in the repeal of the 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy,166 in the Justice Department’s decision 
not to defend the Defense of Marriage Act,167 and in changing 
opinions regarding the issue of gay marriage.168  At the time Lawrence 
was decided, gay marriage was not legal anywhere, but, less than five 
months after Lawrence, Massachusetts legalized gay marriage (with 
five other states following since).169  Lawrence helped propel the 
advancement of social thinking on gay rights:  about half of the 
population currently approves of gay marriage, up from only a third 
of the population just before Lawrence was decided.170 
 
 163. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 91. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See, e.g., DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE 
V. TEXAS (2012). 
 166. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 
3515. 
 167. Ian Saleh, Defense of Marriage Act: Obama Administration Will No Longer 
Defend Legality of Measure, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/23/AR201102230536 
1.html. 
 168. Even President Obama recently stated in his support of gay marriage that his 
opinion on the subject had been “evolving.” Jackie Calmes, Obama Says Same-Sex 
Marriage Should Be Legal, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/05/10/us/politics/obama-says-same-sex-marriage-should-be-legal.html. 
 169. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding 
that denying same-sex couples marriage licenses violates the constitution of 
Massachusetts).  Following Massachusetts, same-sex marriage became legal in 
Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York. 
 170. Linda Feldman, The Gay Marriage Paradox: As Acceptance Rises, So Do 
Legal Barriers, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 17, 2012, 
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The simple lesson from both Brown and Lawrence is that a social 
movement that hopes to reverse a damaging precedent needs to 
formulate a legal strategy that will capitalize on societal opinion, and 
that seeks litigants and factual scenarios that provide the best vehicle 
for their legal arguments.  In addition, the fight alone brings attention 
to a movement’s issues, win or lose, and the ensuing public debate is 
worthwhile to advancing the aims of a social movement. 
B. Strength and Guidance of Prior Dissent 
Certainly, the strength of a prior dissent has an impact on the 
future, wiser Court, particularly when that dissent exposes the moral 
flaws in the majority’s reasoning.  While the Supreme Court has 
reversed itself without the guidance of a dissent, such as in Loving, a 
strong dissent provides the future Court with arguments on which to 
reverse a challenged decision.171  Sometimes, as in Harlan’s dissent in 
Plessy,172 a dissent can function as the Court’s conscience, haunting it 
with a call to come back to its own best principles.173  Harlan’s dissent 
is widely recognized as one of the strongest, most forward-thinking, 
and inherently correct dissenting opinions in Supreme Court 
history.174  The substance of the opinion still rings true today with its 
reminder that equal protection under the law means exactly that—
with no caveats.  While such a call can be ignored for many years, 
history has shown that the Court is likely to respond in time. 
Other dissents, such as Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers, Justice 
Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead, and Justice Stone’s dissents in both 
Olmstead and Minersville are reasoned with such crystalline logic 
that the Court cannot, when given occasion to revisit the earlier 
decision, resist overturning the majority.  Indeed, Justice Powell, who 
voted with the majority and wrote a concurring opinion in Bowers, 
expressed the power that a dissent can have over time when he said, 
four years after Bowers was decided: “[w]hen I had the opportunity 
to reread the opinions a few months later, I thought the dissent had 




 171. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 14. 
 172. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
 173. See, e.g., supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 174. Id. 
 175. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., 530 (1994).  
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C. The Composition of the Court at Time of Decision 
While it is everyone’s hope that the Court will decide rightly 
regardless of its composition, in truth, the composition of the Court is 
particularly important.  It matters who sits on the Supreme 
Court, and it matters which Chief Justice is at the helm.  The simplest 
example of this is the Warren Court, responsible for Brown, Loving, 
and Katz, three cases where the Court got it right after getting it 
wrong.176  The Warren Court untangled stale, wrong, and shameful 
precedent and replaced it with fresh, progressive opinions, moving us 
toward a more tolerant, socially advanced society.  It would be 
difficult to deny that the liberal orientation of a majority of the 
Justices on the Warren Court did not have an effect on the course of 
the law as well as that of the country.  
If there was anyone left who still believed that the Supreme Court 
was a body wholly divorced from subjective beliefs and political 
leanings, and that the makeup of the Court does not impact 
outcomes, the case of Bush v. Gore177 likely disabused the last 
believers.178  Bush fashioned a unique, one-time-only reading of the 
Equal Protection Clause to resolve a case of bottomless political 
import.179   
Moreover, it is obvious to even a casual observer that the Court has 
bent conservatively since Justice Alito, a committed conservative, 
replaced Justice O’Connor, a moderate.180  Since then, which roughly 
marks the beginning of the Roberts Court, the Court not only has 
circumscribed the ability of legislatures to mitigate the effects of gun 
violence, but it has, among other things, famously become more 
deferential to the free speech rights of corporations at the expense of 
Congress’s ability to regulate campaign finance181 and has moved to 
 
 176. See, e.g., discussion supra Part III. 
 177. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 178. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Ten-Year Anniversary of Bush v. Gore, NEW 
YORKER, Dec. 10, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2010/12/06/ 
101206taco_talk_toobin. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in 
Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/ 
us/25roberts.html (noting that “the data show that only one recent replacement 
altered its direction, that of Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. for Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor in 2006, pulling the [C]ourt to the right”). 
 181. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 50 (2010). 
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make access to federal courts more difficult for litigants who seek 
redress for violations of individual rights.182 
D. The Degree of Consensus Among the Court 
The most likely cases subject to reversal are those decided by one 
vote.183  This is because all it takes is one changed mind, or one new 
appointment, and the Court can swing in the other direction.  In those 
instances, the Court must overcome its much-proclaimed reluctance 
to overturn its own precedent.  Indeed, the principle of stare decisis 
does not compel the Court to “to follow a past decision when its 
rationale no longer withstands ‘careful analysis.’”184 
By the time Bowers and Olmstead, both 5-4 decisions, were 
overruled by Lawrence and Katz, respectively, the overruling cases 
received more votes than necessary.185  With Lawrence, the 
composition of the Court had changed such that it even had one vote 
more than necessary to reverse Bowers.186  Importantly, Justice 
O’Connor changed her mind in the intervening years, switching from 
the majority in Bowers to a concurring opinion in Lawrence.187  
O’Connor’s shift shows that not only changes in the lineup of Justices 
can see-saw a 5-4 decision, but so can a change in the thinking of a 
sitting Justice. 
It is plain that a 5-4 decision is more vulnerable than a less evenly 
split decision, and that a change in personnel can tip the balance 
neatly toward the dissenters.  However, a 5-4 decision that is well-
reasoned can survive a change in personnel, especially where society 
has come to rely on the principle of the earlier decision.  For example, 
in 2000 the Rehnquist Court reaffirmed188 the principle announced in 
the Warren Court’s landmark criminal procedure decision, Miranda 
v. Arizona,189 a 5-4 split, despite the makeup of the Court having 
 
 182. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
 183. David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the 
Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-and-politicization-of-the-
supreme-court/259155/ (noting that 5-4 decisions are most likely to be reversed). 
 184. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 577 (2003)). 
 185. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 186. Lawrence was decided by a 6-3 majority. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
 187. Compare id., with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187 (1986). 
 188. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
 189. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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become conservative by comparison.  Where a 5-4 decision relies on 
faulty reasoning, however, it remains vulnerable to reversal.190 
V.  BLUEPRINT FOR OVERTURNING HELLER 
We can sketch a rough blueprint to overturn Heller by applying the 
factors of Part IV.   
First, we must ask ourselves whether Heller is out of sync with 
societal opinions, such that we might consider its reasoning out of 
date.  To answer this question, we must first acknowledge a problem 
facing gun control advocates who would seek to overturn Heller:  the 
relative strength, or lack thereof, of the gun control movement. 
As it stands today, the gun control movement has not been as 
successful—or as well-funded—as the gun rights movement and its 
avatar, the NRA.191  Although a majority of Americans support gun 
control laws, typically these beliefs are held as one among many.192  
On the other hand, the gun rights movement, and in particular, the 
NRA, is simply more concentrated (both politically and financially), 
more strategically savvy, and more tenacious in furthering its aims.193  
The answer to the question of whether Heller’s reasoning is out of 
date, sadly, is probably not.  The reasoning behind Heller is 
intellectually flawed, but the gun rights movement remains in full 
force and that movement has been, unfortunately, louder than its 
opposition. 
The challenge here is one of mobilization and advocacy.  Gun 
control advocates need to reframe the Second Amendment debate to 
place more focus on the rights of innocent citizens whose lives are 
threatened by gun violence—and those whose lives have been 
touched by such violence.  As it stands, much of the Second 
Amendment debate is framed by the NRA and its sympathizers (and 
 
 190. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. 186; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 
(1928). 
 191. See Inside the NRA: Keys to Organizing Success, ADVOCACY ACROSS 
AMERICA (Mar. 28, 2011), http://advocacyamerica.wordpress.com/2011/03/28/ 
interview-7-glen-caroline-nra-ila-grassroots-activism-washington-dc/.  It is important 
to note that the NRA receives a staggering amount of financial support from the gun 
industry. See, e.g., Blood Money: How the Gun Industry Bankrolls the NRA, 
VIOLENCE POLICY CTR. (Apr. 2011), http://www.vpc.org/studies.bloodmoney.pdf. 
 192. See Amanda Terkel, Poll: Majority of Americans, Including Gun Owners, 
Support Tougher Restrictions, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/ 
18/poll-americans-gun-owners-stronger-laws_n_810069.html. 
 193. See Inside the NRA, supra note 191.  
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corporate sponsors), who focus exclusively on the rights of gun 
owners to the exclusion of the rights of all other citizens. 
It is appalling that in the United States, hundreds of thousands of 
people are the victims of crimes committed with guns; approximately 
100,000 people are shot and 30,000 people are killed by guns each 
year.194  Since Heller, a gunman shot Congresswoman Gabrielle 
Giffords and seventeen other people at a shopping center in 
Arizona;195 two men, both dressed as Santa Claus, killed a total of 
fifteen people in two separate incidents in Texas and California;196 a 
seventeen-year-old killed three fellow students with a handgun at a 
school in northeast Ohio;197 and another seventeen year-old, Trayvon 
Martin, was killed with a handgun by an overzealous neighborhood 
watch guard.198  These deaths, along with more than a hundred 
thousand others in the United States since June 26, 2008,199 are simply 
unacceptable and, worse, largely avoidable.   
Despite the high rate of gun violence gripping America, the NRA 
continues to rout the gun control movement and to win public 
relations and policy battles.  In order to push Heller out of odds with 
public sentiment, the gun control movement needs to ratchet up its 
public engagement and publicly articulate how Heller undermines 
public safety by reading an individual right to handguns into the 
 
 194. Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System  Non-Fatal Injury 
Reports, 2009, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, 
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates2001.html (select cause “Firearm” for 
year 2009, the last year in which data was available) (last visited Aug. 31, 2012) 
[hereinafter Non-Fatal Injury Reports]; Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and 
Reporting System Fatal Injury Reports, National and Regional, 1999–2008, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/ 
mortrate10_us.html (select cause “Firearm” for year 2008, the last year in which data 
was available) (last visited Aug. 31, 2012) [hereinafter Fatal Injury Reports].   
 195. Mark Lacey & David M. Herszenhorn, In Attack’s Wake, Political 
Repercussions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/ 
us/politics/09giffords.html. 
 196. Daniel Gilbert & Timothy Martin, Man Dressed as Santa Believed to Shoot 
Six, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970203391104577122873933879132.html. 
 197. Christina Ng, Ohio School Shooting Suspect T.J. Lane Competent to Stand 
Trial, Judge Rules, ABC NEWS, May 2, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ 
headlines/2012/05/ohio-school-schooting-suspect-t-j-lane-competent-to-stand-trial-
judge-rules/. 
 198. Dan Barry et al., Race, Tragedy and Outrage Collide After a Shot in Florida, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/us/trayvon-martin-
shooting-prompts-a-review-of-ideals.html.     
 199. See Fatal Injury Reports, supra note 195 (averaging 30,000 deaths per year 
over the past four years). 
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Constitution.  We deserve to have legislatures address the problem of 
gun violence without being encumbered by a specious reading of the 
Second Amendment.  The Supreme Court is ill-equipped to make 
these types of policy decisions.   
A key challenge for gun-control advocates after Heller is swaying 
public opinion against it and, more generally, against opposition to 
reasonable gun-control legislation that is meant not to disarm gun 
owners, but rather to ensure the safety of all citizens, gun owners 
included. 
Second, the powerful dissent in Heller supports its overturning.  
Justice Stevens’s dissent is strong and well-reasoned.  He stresses two 
critical, glaring flaws in the majority opinion that may be exposed by 
future Courts (or future litigants):  (i) that the majority concocts a 
substantive right into the Constitution from near nothingness; and (ii) 
that the majority ignores that the resolution of the case has harmful, 
real-world consequences, stripping away the right to regulate guns 
from the states and legislatures.200  
As to the reading of the Second Amendment, in particular, Justice 
Stevens provides a textual analysis,201 examines the historical context 
of the debates surrounding the Amendment’s adoption, particularly 
why the Framers were interested in guaranteeing the right of state 
militias to bear arms,202 and shows why the majority’s historical 
sources are insufficient to bear the weight of the conclusions Justice 
Scalia hangs on them.203  Litigants may use Justice Stevens’s dissent as 
a guide to exploit the holes in the majority’s reasoning in future cases 
presented to wiser Courts. 
In concluding his arguments, Stevens provides powerful language 
that shows why the case is not only poorly reasoned and incorrect, but 
also harmful to the established system of placing guncontrol policy in 
the hands of elected officials rather than the Court: 
Until today, it has been understood that legislatures may regulate 
the civilian use and misuse of firearms so long as they do not 
interfere with the preservation of a well-regulated militia.  The 
Court’s announcement of a new constitutional right to own and use 
firearms for private purposes upsets that settled understanding . . . .  
The Court would have us believe that over 200 years ago, the 
Framers made a choice to limit the tools available to elected officials 
 
 200. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 678-80 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 201. Id. at 640-52. 
 202. Id. at 652-62. 
 203. Id. at 662-71. 
ABORN & KOURY_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:44 PM 
2012] TOWARD A FUTURE, WISER COURT 1381 
wishing to regulate civilian uses of weapons, and to authorize this 
Court to use the common-law process of case-by-case judicial 
lawmaking to define the contours of acceptable gun-control 
policy . . . .  I could not possibly conclude that the Framers made 
such a choice.204 
Third, the implications of the future Court’s composition, while 
obviously important, are also at this time unknowable.  Observers of 
the Court will always ponder the intersection of presidential politics 
with the Justices’ health, longevity, and willingness to continue 
serving, but we can only speculate at this point.  Certainly, the next 
presidential election could have a large impact on the future of 
Heller, particularly if President Obama wins the reelection and has 
the opportunity to appoint additional Justices to the Supreme 
Court.205  Should that occur, litigants would be wise to act swiftly to 
present a challenge to Heller while the Court would be responsive to 
such a challenge. 
Finally, the fourth factor, the degree of consensus, favors the 
overturning of Heller simply given the narrowness of the decision. 
 Although it would be pure speculation as to who might have a 
change of heart, the narrow 5-4 split, coupled with Justice Stevens’s 
strong dissent, leaves Heller on a fairly precarious perch.  All it would 
take is one changed mind.  One. 
CONCLUSION 
Although we provide a blueprint for overturning Heller, in truth 
Heller has not been the wild success that the NRA hoped it would be.  
In the wake of Heller, litigants hoping to strike down gun control laws 
using a Heller-based Second Amendment argument have been largely 
unsuccessful.206  Judges across the country, including Republican-
appointed judges, have rejected many Second Amendment challenges 
to reasonable gun control legislation.207  This movement may be 
 
 204. Id. at 679-80. 
 205. With four Justices in their seventies: Ginsburg (79), Scalia (76), Kennedy (75), 
and Breyer (73), the winner of the race for President is likely to have the opportunity 
to appoint one or more Supreme Court justices. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Future of 
an Aging Court Raises Stakes of Presidential Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/us/presidential-election-could-reshape-an-aging-
supreme-court.html. 
 206. See Vice & Ward, supra note 13. 
 207. E.g., Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting 
challenge to a New York law regarding the concealed carry licensing scheme); 
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (rejecting 
challenge to a Georgia law prohibiting firearms in places of worship); People v. 
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evidence that judges are taking to heart Justice Stevens’s criticism 
about judicial overreach into legislative territory. 
Despite its lack of force thus far against many gun control laws, 
Heller remains wrongly decided and thus is vulnerable to the wisdom 
of a future Court and to the rallying cry of the gun control movement.  
If Justice Ginsburg’s vision is realized and Heller is overturned, such 
a case rightfully would take its place next to Brown, Loving, Katz, 
Barnett, and Lawrence in the pantheon of cases where the Supreme 
Court got it right after getting it wrong. 
 
 
Montyce H., 959 N.E.2d 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (rejecting challenge to an Illinois law 
prohibiting carrying a loaded firearm in public); Perry v. State Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 38 
A.3d 942 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (rejecting challenge to a Pennsylvania law 
prohibiting guns in the workplace); see also Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LAW 
CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/07/Post-Heller-Summary-8.1.12.pdf (last updated Aug. 1, 2012).  
